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PARTIES 
The parties in the instant appeal are Mr. Nani Nau ("Mr. Nau") as 
Plaintiff/ Appellant and Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois ("Safeco"), a Washington 
Corporation as Defendant/ Appellee. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Nau failed to present "more than" 
his own testimony in support of his underlying claim regarding the existence of 
debris on the road and thus failed to meet the standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 3 IA-22-305(6). 
Preservation: R. 205. 
Standard of Review: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed on appeal 
for correctness, without any deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. Flowell Elec. Ass'n v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87, ~ 8. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does 
not apply to the instant matter. 
Preservation: R. 205. 
Standard of Review: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed on appeal 
for correctness, without any deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. Flowell Elec. Ass'n v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87, ~ 8 
IV 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-305(2)(b) 
As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately 
caused by the motor vehicle operator. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(6) 
( 6) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
person or the motor vehicle covered by the motor vehicle occupied by the 
covered person, the covered person shall show the existence of the uninsured 
motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence consisting of more than the 
covered person's testimony. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 72-7-409(2), (6) 
(2) A vehicle may not be operated or moved on any highway unless the 
vehicle is constructed or loaded to prevent its contents from dropping~ 
shifting, leaking or otherwise escaping. 
( 6) A person may not operate a vehicle with a load on any highway 
unless the load and any load covering is fastened, secured and confined 
to prevent the covering or load from becoming loose, detached, or in 
any manner a hazard to the safe operation of the vehicle or to other 
highway users. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 
( c) The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
V 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
The instant case is an insurance dispute whereby Mr. Nau seeks to require Safeco 
to provide the coverage he paid for and that is required by statute. Mr. Nau paid Safeco 
for insurance coverage in the amount of $50,000.00 to cover injury he might suffer due to 
the negligence of an uninsured motorist. The term "uninsured motorist" is defined by 
statute to include an unidentified motorist whose actions result in injury to Mr. Nau. 
The basis for Mr. Nau's claims against Safeco stem from a traffic accident that 
occurred on February 25, 2014. The accident occurred while Mr. Nau was driving in the 
far left lane of I-15 near 11400 South in Salt Lake County. Mr. Nau claims that the 
accident was caused by debris in the lane. Mr. Nau tried to avoid the debris but was 
unable to do so. As a result of hitting the debris, Mr. Nau's tire ruptured, and he lost 
control of the vehicle. His vehicle slammed into the median, knocking Mr. Nau 
unconscious. Mr. Nau's wife was a passenger in the vehicle. Although she was looking 
down crocheting at the time of the accident, Mrs. Nau specifically recalls Mr. Nau 
exclaiming "oh" right before she felt a bump as they ran over something on the road, 
resulting in the ruptured tire and the collision with the median. Mr. Nau suffered a 
significant head injury and has lingering and debilitating effects such as memory loss and 
severe mood swings. 
Mr. Nau filed an insurance claim pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of ~ 
his policy with Safeco. Safeco denied the claim. Mr. Nau then filed his Complaint in this 
matter, alleging that the debris in the road was left there by an uninsured motor vehicle as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(2)(b ). 
1 
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Safeco moved for summary judgment based upon the assertion that Mr. Nau could 
not provide the Court with clear and convincing evidence consisting of more than Mr. 
Nau's own testimony as required by Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-305(6). Mr. Nau opposed 
summary judgment asserting that Mrs. Nau's testimony regarding Mr. Nau's exclamation 
followed by her feeling the vehicle "run over" something was sufficient to meet the 
requirement of Subsection 31-22-305(6) as sufficient evidence that was "more than" just 
Mr. Nau's testimony. Mr. Nau also raised in his reply the application of the evidentiary 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which would allow an inference of negligence upon an 
uninsured motorist, especially after the issue of the existence of debris is considered in a 
light most favorable to Mr. Nau. 
The trial court granted Safeco's motion for summary judgment, stating that Mrs. 
Nau's testimony failed to demonstrate the existence of debris in the roadway, and thereby 
her testimony also failed to demonstrate the existence of an uninsured motor vehicle by 
clear and convincing evidence. (See attached Addendum "A," Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.) The trial court also stated that even if Mrs. 
Nau's testimony demonstrated the existence of debris in the roadway, summary judgment 
would still be appropriate because there were no facts to allow a jury to determine, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the debris was in the roadway because of the 
negligence of an uninsured motorist and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not 
apply without evidence of the debris "beyond Mr. Nau's testimony." (R. 205.) 
Mr. Nau appeals the summary judgment granted below and asserts that Mrs. 
Nau's testimony, when considered in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Nau, meets 
2 
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the requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-305(6) requiring that Mr. Nau 
provide ''more than" just his own testimony. Mr. Nau also appeals the trial court's 
summary judgment because, if Mr. and Mrs. Nau's testimony established the existence of 
debris, as posited by the trial court in its decision, then the statutory provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-7-409 allow the doctrine of res ipsa to apply, thereby establishing the 
existence of the uninsured motor vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about February 25, 2012, Mr. Nau and his wife, Mrs. Nau, were 
travelling southbound on I-15, near 11400 South in Salt Lake County. (R. 13 1.) 
2. Mr. Nau was driving and Mrs. Nau was in the passenger seat of their Ford 
Explorer. (R. 130.) 
3. Mr. Nau was driving in the far left lane of the five-lane freeway. (R. 129.) 
4. Specifically, Mr. Nau was driving in the far left lane designated as the 
HOV or carpool lane. (R. 129.) 
5. While driving, Mr. Nau suddenly noticed debris in the road. (R. 129.) 
6. The debris appeared to be something hard a piece of concrete or a piece of 
rubber or even a roll of carpet. (R. 128-29.) 
7. Upon seeing the debris, Mr. Nau said "oh" and tried to avoid the debris. (R. 
122.) ~ 
8. However, he was not able to avoid the debris and he "ran over something." 
(R. 122, 129.) 
3 
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9. Mrs. Nau, who was looking down and crocheting at the time of the 
accident, specifically recalls her husband exclaiming, "oh", and then feeling the car run 
over something on the road, causing damage to the tire and causing their vehicle to pull 
left and run into the median of the freeway. (R. 122.) 
10. After hitting the median, Mr. Nau was knocked unconsc10us and the 
vehicle continued to travel and slam into the median several times before it finally came 
to a stop. (R. 122.) 
11. Mr. Nau suffered extensive head injuries that have had an enduring effect 
upon Mr. Nau, including memory loss and unpredictable mood swings. (R. 74-75.) 
12. Mr. Nau has an insurance policy with Safeco to cover any damage caused 
by an uninsured motorist as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-305. (R. 120-21.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Nau summarizes his arguments as follows: 
I. The Court should reverse the summary judgment ordered below because 
Mr. Nau presented the trial court with "more than" his own testimony. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-305(6), Mr. Nau was required to show the existence of debris, and 
thus the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle, using evidence that consisted of "more 
than" his own testimony, and that is exactly what he did. Mr. Nau included the testimony 
of his wife, Mrs. Nau, who was the only other person in the vehicle involved in the 
accident. Mrs. Nau's testimony corroborated and supported the testimony of Mr. Nau and 
should be considered as testimony separate from and in addition to the testimony of Mr. 
Nau. Once Mr. Nau provided the trial court with Mrs. Nau's testimony, the evidence 
4 
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before the trial court consisted of "more than" just Mr. Nau's testimony, and the statutory 
requirement for "more than" Mr. Nau's testimony set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-
305(6) was met, thereby precluding summary judgment on that particular issue. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order based on the foregoing grounds was erroneous 
and the Court should reverse the trial court's decision to grant Safeco's motion for 
summary judgment. 
2. The Court should reverse the summary judgment ordered below because 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the instant case and allows this matter to 
proceed to trial. The trial court stated that res ipsa does not apply because there is no 
evidence that debris was in the roadway due to the negligence of an uninsured motorist. 
(R. 205.) However, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §72-7-409, the statutory duties placed 
upon every motorist, including an uninsured motorist, allows Mr. Nau to meet each of the 
three requirements to lay a proper foundation for the application of res ipsa in the case at 
hand. Once the foundation for res ipsa is present, the mere presence of debris in the far 
left lane of a five-lane interstate freeway allows a presumption of negligence by an 
uninsured motorist. With this presumption, the only remaining question is a question of 
fact pertaining to the existence of the debris in the road. This question presents a genuine 
issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order based on the foregoing grounds was erroneous 
and the Court should reverse the trial court's decision to grant Safeco's motion for 
summary judgment. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
An appellate court reviews the grant of a summary judgment motion for 
correctness, giving no deference to the legal conclusions reached by the trial court. 
Flowell Elec. Ass'n v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87, ~ 8. Importantly, summary 
judgment is only proper where all facts and inferences are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, and despite such favorable inferences, the moving 
party is able to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). In the case at 
hand, not only was Safeco not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but there was a 
specific question of material fact that required a finder of fact to make a factual 
determination, thereby precluding an award of summary judgment. 
As discussed more fully below, this Court should reverse the summary judgment 
granted by the trial court because the trial court committed reversible error when it failed 
to acknowledge that Mr. Nau provided the trial court with "more than" just his own 
testimony to support his claims. The Court should also reverse the summary judgment 
granted by the trial court because the trial court committed reversible error when it found 
that the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the instant case. 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
GRANTED BELOW BECAUSE MR. NAU PRESENTED THE TRIAL 
COURT WITH EVIDENCE THAT CONSISTED OF MORE THAN JUST 
HIS OWN TESTIMONY. 
The initial question presented in this appeal is a simple one: Did the evidence 
before the Court at the summary judgment stage consist solely of the testimony of Mr. 
6 
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Nau? If the answer to this question is "no," the trial court committed reversible error and 
the Court should reverse the summary judgment granted below. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 3 IA-22-305(6): 
When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection (2)(b)1 proximately caused an accident without touching the 
covered person or the motor vehicle covered by the motor vehicle occupied 
by the covered person, the covered person shall show the existence of the 
uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence co11sisting of 
more than the covered person's testimony. 
( emphasis added) 
Under the plain language of Subsection 31 A-22-305( 6), a claim does not need to 
exclude the covered person's testimony completely,2 but the covered person's testimony 
cannot be the only evidence presented in support of the claim regarding the uninsured 
motorist. 
1 Subsection 31 A-22-305(2)(b) states that, [ a ]s used in this section, "uninsured motor 
vehicle" includes: 
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately 
caused by the motor vehicle operator. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(2)(b). 
2 Based upon the trial court's order granting summary judgment, it appears that the trial 
court interpreted Subsection 3 lA-22-305(6) to require a complete exclusion of Mr. Nau's 
testimony, and that Mr. Nau had the burden of proving the existence of the debris with 
evidence completely separate from the testimony of Mr. Nau. This improper application 
of the requirements of the statute is indicated where the trial court stated that "'[t]he 
testimony of Mrs. Nau ... does not establish the presence of debris in the road." As 
discussed in this section, this erroneous interpretation does not comply with the plain 
language of the statute and fails to consider Mrs. Nau's testimony in its role as 
corroborating and validating the testimony provided by Mr. Nau from his recorded 
statement regarding the debris he saw that day. 
7 
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Accordingly, all Mr. Nau needed to do to prevent summary judgment was to 
~ present "more than" his own testimony to corroborate his claims, and that is exactly what 
Mr. Nau did through Ms. Nau's testimony. 
In his testimony, Mr. Nau provided evidence that he saw debris on the freeway, he 
tried to avoid the debris but was unable to do so, and that upon hitting the debris, his tire 
exploded, slamming his vehicle into the median of the freeway. In addition to this, Mr. 
Nau provided the testimony of the only passenger in the vehicle, Mrs. Nau. Ms. Nau 
recalls her husband exclaiming "oh", after which she felt the vehicle run over something 
prior to the loss of control of the vehicle and the vehicle striking the median. 
To satisfy the requirements of Subsection 3 lA-22-305(6), Mr. Nau presented both 
his testimony and the testimony of his wife. His wife's testimony corroborated his 
testimony regarding the existence of debris, and the fact that it hitting this debris caused 
the blown tire and the loss of control. 
Because the trial court failed to recognize that Mrs. Nau's testimony met the 
requirement to have "more than" just Mr. Nau's testimony, the trial court committed 
reversible error, and this Court should reverse the summary judgment improperly granted 
below. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
GRANTED BELOW BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR ALLOWS A JURY TO DETERMINE THAT DEBRIS IN THE 
FAR LEFT LANE OF A FIVE-LANE FREEWAY IS A RESULT OF 
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF AN UNINSURED MOTORIST. 
The trial court found that summary judgment was appropriate because the doctrine 
of res ipsa did not apply. The trial court stated that res ipsa was not applicable because a 
8 
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jury would have to speculate whether the debris ended up on the road due to the 
negligence of the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or some other person. (R. 205.) 
As discussed below, the trial court failed to apply several statutory provisions that place 
responsibility for debris falling from a vehicle squarely upon the shoulders of the 
operator of the vehicle. These statutory provisions, together with the undisputed evidence 
that Mr. Nau was driving in the far left lane of a five lane interstate freeway provide 
sufficient basis to allow res ipsa to apply to the instant matter. 
Although Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the application of 
res ipsa where an accident is caused by debris in the road, there are specific guidelines on 
when res ipsa may apply, regardless of the facts of the case. Specifically, Utah courts 
have stated that res ipsa applies when three items are established: 
'"(I) ... [t]he accident was of a kind which in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had the defendant(s) used due care, (2) 
the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of the accident 
under the management and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident 
happened irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff." 
Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, ,r 22, 141 P.3d 629,637. 
As to the first and second elements, they are both met by applying Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-7-409(2), (6) and (8), which state that: 
(2) A vehicle may not be operated or moved on any highway unless the 
vehicle is constructed or loaded to prevent its contents from dropping, 
shifting, leaking or otherwise escaping. 
( 6) A person may not operate a vehicle with a load on any highway 
unless the load and any load covering is fastened, secured and confined 
to prevent the covering or load from becoming loose, detached, or in 
any manner a hazard to the safe operation of the vehicle or to other 
highway users. 
9 
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(8) Any person who violates this section 1s guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor. 
Given the clear statutory responsibility placed upon the operator of a vehicle 
regarding any and all items in the vehicle, the statutory presumption is that due care could 
have prevented the debris from falling, thereby fulfilling the first element for res ipsa set 
forth in Youngblood. 
The foregoing statutory sections clearly show that the operator of a motor vehicle 
is presumed to be in control of the vehicle and everything on it. Accordingly, the statute 
also allows Mr. Nau to establish the second element for res ipsa. 
Finally, the last element is also easily met as there has been no evidence that Mr. 
Nau was operating the vehicle that dropped the debris. 
"It is a general rule of Utah law that violation of a standard of safety set by statute 
or ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence." Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., 
903 P.2d 423,426 (Utah 1995). Other courts have used similar criminal statutes as a basis 
to provide the necessary foundation for res ipsa to apply. See Pfoutz v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a statute similar to Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-7-409 provided sufficient foundation for res ipsa to apply to an accident 
on a freeway in Missouri that involved debris.) 
With testimony showing the existence of debris on the freeway, and with the 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa as discussed above, Mr. Nau's claims sufficiently 
show that summary judgment was not appropriate as there was a genuine issue of 
material fact, and Safeco was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
10 
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Accordingly. the Court should hold that res ipsa applies to the instant matter and 
\ 
reverse the summary judgment ordered by the trial court below. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the summary judgment 
granted belO\v and allow Mr. Nau·s claims to proceed to trial. 
Dated this 30th day of October, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Addendum "A" 
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Nathan R. Skeen (# 12662) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
l O Exchange Place, 11 th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000 
Telephone: 801-521-9000 
nrs@.scmlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
NANI NAU, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUl'vflvfARY JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 140400338 
vs. 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
ILLINOIS, a Washington Corporation, Tier I 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on March 3, 2015, on Defendant Safeco Insurance 
Company of Illinois' ("Safeco's") Motion for Summary Judgment. Nathan R. Skeen appeared on 
behalf of Safeco. Hutch U. Fale appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff Nani Nau. Having reviewed 
the briefing and heard oral argument, and for good cause appearing, the Court entered the 
following findings and conclusions: 
vJ April 22, 2015 05:02 PM 
I. Safeco has come forward with undisputed facts which, if accepted as true, 
wou Id entitle Safeco to summary judgment. Thus, the burden of proof has 
shifted to Mr. Nau, the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at 
trial, to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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April 22, 2015 05:02 PM 
for trial. 
2. Mr. Nau must point to evidence in addition to his own testimony pursuant to 
Utah's uninsured motorist statute (Utah Code Ann. § 3 IA-22-305) because he 
alleges that the accident was proximately caused by an uninsured motor 
- -
vehicle that left the scene of the accident without touching Mr. Nau or his 
vehicle. The testimony ofMrs. Nau, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Nau, does not establish the existence of debris in the road. Because Mr. Nau 
cannot establish the existence of an uninsured motor vehicle through evidence 
that consists of more than his own testimony, Safeco's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. Even if a reasonable jury could find that Mrs. Nau' s testimony were sufficient 
to establish the existence of debris in the roadway, there are no facts upon 
which a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the 
debris was in the roadway because of the negligence of an uninsured motor 
vehicle operator. 
4. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the facts of this case to 
relieve Mr. Nau from his burden of proving debris was in the roadway as a 
result of the negligence ofan uninsured motorist. The jury would be required 
to speculate as to whether and what was in the roadway without evidence 
beyond Mr. Nau's testimony. Accordingly, there are not sufficient facts to 
demonstrate that the alleged debris was in the roadway as a result of the undue 
care of an uninsured motor vehicle's operator. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Proposed Order was provided on 4/6/15 and no objections have been made 
A VERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC 
r-tmch u. Fale 
Altorneyfur Plain!{/./' 
END OF ORDER 
Judge's electronic signature appears at the top of the first page of this document 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I 5th day of April, 2015, I caused true and correct 
copies of ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
to-be electronie-ally filed through the Green filing system with-notice-sent-to the following:~--
Hutch U. Fale 
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC 
1422 East 820 North 
Orem, UT 84097 
Attorneys for P /aintiffs 
021397.0063 / 3195535.1 
April 22, 2015 05:02 PM 
Isl Penny Berendson 
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